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ABSTRACT Google’s dominance over the web allows it to dictate various norms and
practices that regulate the state of contemporary capitalism online. The way in which Google
operates as a company and generates revenue is often sidelined in academic discussions
regarding the cultural implications of how its search engine functions. Almost 90% of
Google’s revenue is derived from advertising, despite Larry Page and Sergey Brin’s original
academic paper regarding Google in which they argue that advertising produces mixed
motives that make it an unfeasible way to fund search engines. This article outlines how
Google’s model of advertising reﬂects and encourages wider changes in capitalism as it shifts
from its twentieth-century Fordist incarnation to contemporary Post-Fordist arrangements of
labour. In doing so, this article analyses Google’s two main advertising systems, AdWords
and AdSense, and proposes that these ﬁnancial models have signiﬁcant effects upon online
discourse. In discussing AdWords, this article details some of the tensions between the local
and the global that develop when tracing ﬂows of information and capital, speciﬁcally
highlighting Google’s impact on the decline of online language diversity. In outlining AdSense,
this article demonstrates how Google’s hegemonic control prescribes which parts of the web
can be monetised and which remain unproﬁtable. In particular, in drawing from existing
studies, evidence is provided that Google’s AdSense programme, along with Google’s rela-
tionship with Facebook, incentivised the rise of fake news in the 2016 US presidential elec-
tion. This work builds on existing scholarship to demonstrate that Google’s economic
inﬂuence has varied and far-reaching effects in a number of contexts and is relevant to
scholars in a range of disciplines. As such, this article is intended as a discursive introduction
to the topic and does not require speciﬁc disciplinary background knowledge. In doing so, this
article does not attempt to provide the ﬁnal word on Google’s relationship to digital capit-
alism, but rather, demonstrate the proﬁtability of a Post-Fordist perspective, in order to
enable a wider engagement with the issues identiﬁed.
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This article focuses on how Google generates revenue andthe various signiﬁcant ways in which this impacts upon thewider digital information ecology on the web. Search
engines have been addressed from a wide range of academic
perspectives including, but not limited to, computer science, law,
politics, information retrieval, and new media studies.1 However,
the role that Google’s advertising business model plays within
contemporary capitalism is rarely addressed directly. This topic is
crucially important because it impacts a wide-range of phenom-
ena that might otherwise be considered non-economic, such as
general online language use, and the incentives underpinning a
range of content, such as fake news. In order to situate these
issues within broader trends in contemporary capitalism, this
article draws on Post-Fordist theory, which is outlined below,
placing it within a digital context. This perspective highlights the
extensive inﬂuence that Google’s revenue model has upon digital
culture.
Alphabet, Google’s holding company created in 2015, is one of
the most valuable companies in the world.2 It has a market value
of over $500 billion and in 2016 generated a revenue of $77
billion. Ask someone what Google does and they will likely reply
that it is a search engine company. However, a more accurate
description is that Google is an advertising company. 88.7% of
Google’s revenue comes from advertising (Alphabet, 2017, p 22);
although, as will be outlined below, Google’s modes of advertising
deviate signiﬁcantly from any existing forms of traditional
advertising. The economic success of such a shift is producing
dramatically widespread effects within many areas of society. This
article addresses two in particular: the reiﬁcation of online lan-
guage and the rise of fake news. There are many other important
impacts of Google’s advertising programmes, however, focusing
on these two issues demonstrates the broad scope on which such
a narrow economic model operates.
Google has two main advertising ventures. The ﬁrst of which
is ‘Google properties’, the service for hosting advertisements
built into its own products (its search engine and Gmail, for
example) the most signiﬁcant part of which is AdWords. The
second is ‘Google Network Members’ properties’, a brokerage
service that runs advertisements on third-party websites, the
most signiﬁcant part of which is AdSense.3 This article outlines
AdWords and AdSense separately, as they each have different
impacts, and highlights one pertinent consequence of each, the
reiﬁcation of language and the rise of fake news, respectively.
71.3% of Google’s revenues comes advertising on Google’s own
sites and is mainly derived from AdWords (Alphabet, 2017, p
23). AdWords is an auction process that Google operates to
allocate paid results (referred to by Google as sponsored results)
to search engine queries, which sit separately on top or to the
side of unpaid result (referred to by Google as organic results,
see Fig. 1). These sponsored AdWords results are visually deli-
neated from the organic results produced by the PageRank
algorithm and other factors. In addition to this programme,
17.4% of Google’s overall revenue is derived from non-Google
sites on which Google hosts third-party advertising content
using its AdSense programme (Alphabet, 2017, p 24). AdSense is
Google’s method of linking third-party advertisements to rele-
vant third-party content, such as blogs or news sites, and dis-
playing advertisements alongside selected content in digital
billboards. Although there are other companies that provide
advertising for third parties, Google AdSense is by far the lar-
gest. It was reported in The New York Times that ‘[i]n the ﬁrst
quarter of 2016, 85 cents of every new dollar spent in online
advertising will go to Google or Facebook’ (Herrman, 2016). The
second section of this article outlines how these two companies
reinforce their joint dominance.
The remaining 11.3% of Alphabet’s revenue represents the
sales of apps and media content in the Google Play store as well as
other smaller ventures such as certain Google branded hardware,
for example sales of Google Chromebooks and Pixel smart-
phones. None of Alphabet’s other activities ‘meet the quantitative
thresholds to qualify as reportable segments; therefore, the
operating segments are combined and disclosed […] as Other
Bets’ (Alphabet, 2017, p 21) These smaller subsidiaries, known as
other bets ‘Access, Calico, CapitalG, Nest, Verily, Waymo, and X,’
and other initiatives (Alphabet, 2017, p 21) have a combined
revenue of $809 million, which is only 0.9% of Alphabet’s total
revenue, and have combined operating losses of over $3578
million (Alphabet, 2017, p 74). These divisions focus on a range
of projects from Calico and Verily’s biomedical research into
extending the human lifespan, Waymo’s self-driving cars, and X’s
Google Glass augmented reality headset. Whilst these kinds of
projects are covered more frequently in the popular press they do
not contribute to Google’s ﬁnancial success.
In summary: Google generates almost all of Alphabet’s rev-
enue; almost all of Google’s revenue is made from advertising; the
majority of this advertising revenue comes from AdWords, i.e.,
sponsored links included in search engine results; ﬁnally, Google
spends a great deal of its revenue on smaller ambitious ventures.
This article draws from Post-Fordist theory to provide a historical
and theoretical context for Google’s place in contemporary digital
capitalism. In doing so, the article demonstrates the ways in
which the Internet and the web have played a major role in the
changing ﬂows of information, labour, and capital and outlines
how at the heart of this change is Google: both the company and
its products. The ﬁrst section of this article focuses on AdWords,
arguing that it constitutes a global linguistic market and typiﬁes a
number characteristics of Post-Fordist capitalism. This section
also addresses how Google’s ﬁnancial model contributes to the
decline of language diversity online by incentivising the use of
more proﬁtable languages over others. The second section of this
article focuses on the ways in which AdSense shapes online dis-
course and dictates particular norms. In particular, this section
draws out the reciprocal links between AdSense and Facebook
and demonstrates how Google’s mode of advertising facilitated
the rise of fake news during the 2016 US presidential election.
Before addressing these two topics, the following section estab-
lishes the framework of Post-Fordist theory, in order to con-
textualise Google’s activities within the broader shifts of
contemporary capitalism.
The context of Post-Fordism and Google’s attitude towards
advertising
Google’s modes of advertising represent a sea-change from tra-
ditional twentieth-century advertising which, in turn, operates
within a much larger and more general shift away from
twentieth-century modes of capitalism. This article draws from a
particular group of thinkers, a group of Italian Neo-Marxists,
loosely connected to the ‘workerism’ (operaismo) movement
during the 1960s and 1970s, in order to better contextualise
contemporary digital capitalism. The work of these
thinkers–Paolo Virno, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, and
Maurizio Lazzarato are a few notable examples–has come to be
known as Post-Fordist theory.4 This designation of Post-Fordist
theory represents a number of different, although related, atti-
tudes towards the way in which capitalism has changed since the
second half of the twentieth-century, speciﬁcally in regard to the
role of work. Post-Fordist theory traces the decline of the
dominant kind of capitalism in the early twentieth-century,
Fordism5 while theorising and analysing the post-industrial
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modes of capitalism that they describe as Post-Fordist. These
models of Post-Fordist labour relations, which stress the impor-
tance of cognitive, ﬂexible, and precarious labour, are key to
understanding Google’s inﬂuence on contemporary capitalism in
a digital context. Various other thinkers outside of this Italian
Neo-Marxist group have described the current mode of capital-
ism emphasising similar characteristics under a range of names:
‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri, 2001), ‘Late Capitalism’ (Jameson,
1992), ‘PostCapitalism’ (Mason, 2016), ‘Capitalist Realism’
(Fisher, 2009), ‘semiocapitalism’ (Berardi, 2015), ‘Cognitive
Capitalism’ (Boutang, 2012). Although these related approaches
use different terminology, the various characteristics highlighted
complement a description of contemporary capitalism as Post-
Fordist.
The effects of Post-Fordism are numerous and many directly
relate to Google’s role in contemporary capitalism. To attempt to
address all of these characteristic changes goes beyond the scope
of a single article, however, it should be noted that Google’s
advertising ventures of AdWords and AdSense operate in concert
with a range of other contemporary issues. These include: the
increasingly precarious nature of employment; the dissolution of
clear boundaries between work and free time, as well as between
paid and unpaid work; the diminishing solidarity, rights, and
freedoms of workers; the increasing time spent working, in each
working day, as well as an increasing age of retirement; the
homogenisation of different types of work through the use of
information technologies; employing automation to replace
workers; the changing nature of digital commodities that turn
many product based industries into service ones. The list is only
indicative, rather than exhaustive, aiming to provide a sense of
Post-Fordism’s extensive nature. An exaggerated example of a day
that exempliﬁes Post-Fordist labour relations might be as follows:
a woman catches an Uber to her timeshared ofﬁce where she
works as a digital brand consultant. Her work consists of
managing Twitter likes and increasing Facebook engagement. She
orders her lunch via an app, which is delivered by a part-time
student working as a Deliveroo. She spends her evening watching
Netﬂix, a subscription television service, as she does not have
Fig. 1 Google's sponsored results. The results in the red box are the sponsored results; the results outside of the red box are the ‘organic’ results organised
by the PageRank algorithm and other factors. Screenshot taken by the author. This ﬁgure is licensed under a CC-BY Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License. Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with permission
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room to keep DVDs in her small Airbnb. That evening she
spends an hour talking to a Chinese student over a language
learning service, like italki, not to make money but in exchange
for credits to be redeemed at a later date, once she ﬁnds the time
to start learning Spanish. Not all work is like this, far from it;
material labour is still a major part of contemporary work around
the world. In addition, this example only highlights the visible
changes that might seem to only effect a niche group of people.
However, this article aims to show that Google’s business draws
everyone online into various immaterial labour arrangements
with far reaching consequences, many of which are difﬁcult to
detect. There are numerous dimensions to such an arrangement
and different people are implicated into Post-Fordist labour
relations to different degrees. In focusing on how AdWords reiﬁes
language online and how AdSense incentivises fake news, this
article demonstrates two examples in which all web users are
impacted by Post-Fordist effects, even if their lives could not seem
further from that of the example outlined above.
AdWords: organic vs. sponsored results.
‘At least in terms of revenue generation, Google’s core
business isn’t facilitating searches, it’s selling advertising
space—or rather, selling our attention to advertisers and
managing both the price it charges for access to our
attention and the relative visibility of those advertisements.’
(Vaidhyanathan, 2012, p 26)
Vaidhyanathan’s above quotation is useful because it draws our
attention to Google’s proﬁtability as a company. That the
majority of Google’s revenue comes from the advertising through
its search engine should be surprising, given that the original plan
for Google’s search engine was diametrically opposed to
advertising. Despite the plans of the founders for Google to
remain in the academic realm, Google generates revenue when
users click on advertisements, not when users ﬁnd successful
answers to their queries. As Steven Levy describes, ‘[i]n their
original academic paper about Google, [Larry] Page and [Sergey]
Brin had devoted an appendix to the evils of conventional
advertising’ (2011, p 84). Their academic paper argued that their
method, using the PageRank algorithm, was far more accurate
than existing search engines that relied on advertising speciﬁcally
because it did not bias results in order to make a proﬁt. Their
approach required that their search engine be ‘transparent and in
the academic realm’ because, as the founders explain:
‘advertising funded search engines will be inherently biased
towards the advertisers and away from the needs of the
consumers. […]
Furthermore, advertising income often provides an incen-
tive to provide poor quality search results. For example, we
noticed a major search engine would not return a large
airline’s homepage when the airline’s name was given as a
query. It so happened that the airline had placed an
expensive ad, linked to the query that was its name. A better
search engine would not have required this ad, and possibly
resulted in the loss of the revenue from the airline to the
search engine. In general, it could be argued from the
consumer point of view that the better the search engine is,
the fewer advertisements will be needed for the consumer
to ﬁnd what they want. This, of course, erodes the
advertising supported business model of the existing search
engines.’ (Brin and Page, 1998)
However, early on in their business, Google started using
advertisements to fund their search engine. These advertisements,
sponsored links, have always been kept separate from the organic
links. In their paper, Brin and Page speciﬁcally took aim at search
engines that mixed their results together so that users could not see
which of the results had been paid for and which were freely chosen
by the search engine. In this regard, Google have not gone back on
their original statement; however, the problem remains: if a set of
results is good enough, a user will never need to click on the
sponsored link. In the original vision outlined by Brin and Page,
advertisements are always an indication of failure, but today represent
the overwhelming majority of Google’s revenue. The following
section outlines how this perspective of success vs. failure is deceptive
and provides a different lens with which to describe the complex
relationship between Google’s search engine and advertising.
AdWords: the ﬁrst global, real-time and multilingual linguistic
market. This section provides a speciﬁc outline of how AdWords
operates in order to demonstrate the close links between Google’s
search engine and advertising. In particular, this section draws on
the work of Frederic Kaplan who argues that AdWords constitutes
a form of ‘linguistic capitalism’ (2014, p 58), in the tradition of
Post-Fordism; the conclusion of which is that Google’s mode of
advertising is having a widespread effect on all language usage on
the web. Even if users are not explicitly altering the language they
use online, anyone who uses the web communicates in a context
where economic value alters every part of their linguistic land-
scape. Users may be completely unaware of this process of lin-
guistic reiﬁcation but still navigate an uneven digital space in
which there are economic incentives that prioritise some words
and ideas and deprioritise others. In addition, the economic value
of different languages is not the same, and therefore, as discussed
later, each language group is affected to a different extent.
AdWords is the auction system that provides advertising in the
form of sponsored results that ﬁll the top or side of a Google
search result. An auction occurs every time a query is searched
and balances the amount of money automatically bid by a
company, against an automated quality score, given by Google. If
low-quality scores are given or if there has not been an
advertisement placed that is deemed relevant to the query,
Google will not provide an advertisement. If a user clicks on one
of these sponsored advertisements, the company being advertised
pays Google; if not, no money is exchanged. Therefore, both
Google and its business customers have strong economic
incentives for the advertisements to succeed. A key aspect of
AdWords is designing advertisements with speciﬁc kinds of
search queries in mind. Kaplan explains that, ‘[f]irst, advertisers
select a keyword—for instance ‘vacation’—and deﬁne the
maximum price they would be ready to pay if a user arrives on
their site by clicking on the link of the ad’ (2014, p 58). Keywords
selected by advertisers are then used interchangeably with other
similar words selected by Google. The advertiser must also select
the ‘product or service [they] wish to advertise’ from a
predetermined list, the language they wish to advertise in, and
the geographical locations they wish to target with their
advertising. Google has guidelines for prohibited AdWords
content,6 which mostly relate to more general country speciﬁc
laws.7 In addition, the process of having to choose from a pre-
established list of products and services means that many taboo
grey areas are condensed into more general subjects and thus
implicitly censored. After this process is completed
‘Google associates a quality score with the ad. This ﬁgure,
ranging from 1 to 10, evaluates the global ‘quality’ of the ad,
which is computed through a complex combination of
various factors, including the relevance of the text ad
regarding the keyword, the average number of clicks on the
ad, and the performance and quality of the linked website.
This score measures how well the ad is working.’ (2014, p 58)
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This measure of ‘quality’ takes into account a judgement of the
advertisement (clarity of expression), its relevance to the website
it links to (an advertisement for swimming goggles should lead to
a sports equipment shop rather than a public swimming pool),
and the quality of the destination website (based on Google’s
usual metrics including the layout of keywords and the link score
generated from other websites linking to that site). Whereas
traditional advertising might aim to change someone’s mind or
introduce them to a new idea, AdWords advertisements are an
attempt to reﬂect the existing perspective of an individual.
AdWords advertisements, in aiming to be relevant, need to
replicate the current outlook of a user, or successfully predict
their context, in order to be given a high-quality score. Finally, the
‘rank of an ad is calculated by multiplying the bid times the
quality score’ therefore an ‘ad with a good score and medium bid
can overcome a less efﬁcient ad with a higher bid. Eventually, the
price paid by the advertisers is not their maximum auction offer
but a slightly lower price, one computed on a second-price
auction model’ (2014, p 59). This ﬁnancial model means that
small advertisers can compete with larger ones if they can offer a
higher quality advert, as judged by Google. So, for example, in a
search for ‘craft ale’ (see Fig. 2) Amazon might have set the
highest bid for that phrase but it is listed underneath two smaller
but more specialised craft beer sellers, with higher quality scores.
This approach prevents companies with deeper pockets out-
bidding smaller but more relevant competitors.
An AdWords auction occurs every single time a user searches a
query using Google’s search engine. An estimate, based on
Google’s statement to search engine expert Danny Sullivan, that
they handle at least ‘2 trillion searches per year’ (Sullivan, 2016),
means that at the lowest estimate, Google runs a staggering
63,000 linguistic auctions per second. Kaplan describes this
process as:
‘the ﬁrst global, real-time and multilingual linguistic
market. As a consequence, the ﬂuctuation of the price of
keywords indirectly reﬂects global linguistic movements.
The value of some keywords like ‘snowboarding’ or ‘bikini’
varies seasonally. The increase and decrease of the word
‘gold’ is linked with the perceived state of ﬁnancial crisis.
Google makes a lot of money on some very competitive
keywords like ‘ﬂowers,’ ‘hotels,’ ‘vacation’ and ‘love.’ It also
organises bids for buying the names of famous people
(‘Picasso,’ ‘Freud’). Bidding strategies vary. Anything that
can be named can be associated with a bid.’ (2014, p 59)
Google provides advertisers using AdWords with a tool that
organises, suggests and estimates the cost of various words and
phrases. Not only do the prices reﬂect real world events, but also,
various companies can drive up the prices of words for their
competitors. Such behaviour was raised in the 2007 court case
‘Google, Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.’ John
Battelle in The Search details how
Fig. 2 AdWord results for 'craft ale'. The advertisement order lists the specialist and local sponsored results before Amazon’s advertisement. Screenshot
taken by the author. This ﬁgure is licensed under a CC-BY Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Google and the Google logo are
registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with permission
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‘in early 2003, American Blinds realised that while it owned
the trademark on ‘American Blinds,’ it didn’t own the
market for it on Google’s AdWords service. Competitors
were snatching up the company’s trademarks as AdWords
terms (they did so by paying more for them, essentially), so
that when customers typed ‘American blinds’ into Google
they’d get advertisements for companies like JustBlinds.
com and Select Blinds.’ (Battelle, 2006, p 180)
The case of American Blinds vs. Google was described by
commentators as a clear-cut trademark infringement that favoured
American Blinds, however in a shock to many legal commentators,
after ‘almost 4 years of litigation’ American Blinds ﬁnally dropped
the suit in a ‘‘stunning victory for Google,’ wrote Eric Goldman, an
assistant professor at Santa Clara University School of Law’ (in
Auchard, 2007). Google has a track record for winning legal battles
that establish digital norms8 and this case changed the conventional
understanding of how legal deﬁnitions of ownership translate
online. Google’s legal defence outlined an aggressive position
concerning the relationship between language and capital: old
notions of linguistic ownership do not apply online. Not only are all
words and phrases available to anyone, the auction winners are not
even necessarily the highest bidder. Google’s quality ranking system,
when coupled with their dominance in the search engine market,
means that they have become the gatekeeper of language ownership
online. As language ownership is calculated and awarded anew
through an auction every single time a search takes place, at least
63,000 times a second, no one can really claim ownership of
language: words and their relation to entities are constantly in ﬂux
under Google’s watchful eyes.
Because AdWords effects all words, not just copyrighted ones,
we have a situation in which all words and ideas online are
becoming commodities. The advertising model of AdWords,
therefore, encourages companies into an association with
language whereby a company does not connect their product
with a speciﬁc slogan but to an unlimited range of words, at
various times in speciﬁed locations. Many scholars have linked
this expansion to the concept of the ‘long tail’, originally
popularised by Chris Anderson,9 as Levy explains
‘[s]ince Google searches were often unique, with esoteric
keywords, there was a possibility to sell ads for categories
that otherwise never would have justiﬁed placement. On the
Internet it was possible to make serious money by catering
to the ‘long tail’ of businesses that could not buy their way
into mass media.’ (2011, p 85)
Because of this phenomenon, and in conjunction with the
auction aspect of AdWords that means that uncommon words are
very cheap to bid on, all words in all languages can theoretically
become proﬁtable. There is an incentive to increase the prices of
popular words but also to spread the reach of a campaign to niche
words that might not seem in any way commodiﬁable but would
have a low market value. Because advertisers are only charged
when a user clicks on their advert there is no cost or disadvantage
to placing bids on uncommon or unlikely words. This structural
logic places clear incentives on advertisers to increase the scope of
their chosen words and encourages a kind of linguistic land grab.
Such an expansion then has an effect on all language used online,
not just trademarks or particular phrases associated with
companies or products. In shifting which words and phrases
become discoverable through a search engine, and which are
concealed, as well as how certain language becomes received in
various contexts, economics comes to structure an increasing
percentage of online linguistic communication. Kaplan argues that
‘[e]ven if Google’s autocompletion may not be explicitly
biased toward more economically valuable expressions, it
nevertheless tends to transform natural language into more
regular, economically exploitable linguistic subsets.’ (2014,
p 60)
When born-digital content, for example online news, is written
with search engine visibility in mind it is, in effect, automatically
tailored towards advertising; advertisers and content creators
both want to strengthen their association to the kinds of words
and phrases used in search engine queries. In addition, as online
content is increasingly dependent on third-party advertising, a
topic that is discussed in second section of this article, these two
activities–bidding on search terms and writing online content that
is discoverable through search engines–become enmeshed and
mutually standardise the kinds of linguistic patterns on the web.
Google’s institutionalisation, data-collection and advertising. This
standardisation across languages is also enhanced by Google’s
institutionalisation of the AdWords programme. Not only do
companies that advertise through AdWords have access to
numbers of tools and analytics, but this work is often outsourced
to professional AdWords companies.10 Google runs a certiﬁcation
programme which provides training, study materials and holds
exams for individuals to become accredited. To keep their status
as an accredited AdWords professional, individuals need to pass
two of Google’s AdWords exams every year. In order for an
advertising company to work as a ‘Google Partner’, they need to
employ at least two members of staff who are currently accredited
as AdWords professionals. The AdWords accreditation has even
been added as a component of many Business Masters (MBA)
degrees.11 Google also supplies funding to those institutions
awarding MBAs through their ‘Google Online Marketing Chal-
lenge’12 which strengthens links between universities, professors,
and students with Google AdWords and in turn strengthens
Google’s hegemony.
Through Google’s various projects, the company has an
enormous collection of data, which, when combined with their
methods of tracking users’ behaviour on the web ensure that
Google’s advertising efforts are as effective as possible. As Ken
Auletta describes:
‘It was Google’s ambition, Schmidt and Page and Brin liked
to say, to provide an answer to the adman’s legendary line ‘I
know half of my advertising works, I just don’t know which
half.’ To help them sort through the digital clicks, Google
and other new media companies relied on what are called
cookies, software ﬁles that reside on a user’s browser and
keep track of their activities online: search questions asked,
Web pages visited, time spent on each Web page,
advertisements clicked on, items purchased […] Although
the cookie doesn’t identify the user by name or address, it
does assemble data advertisers crave and couldn’t get from
traditional media companies.’ (2011, p 7)
Cookies and measurements of user interactions with search
results allow Google to capture latent information that is used to
further personalise advertising.
Describing Google as an advertising company (rather than a
search engine that also advertises) reﬁgures their search engine
simply as a way of capturing economically useful information
through mutual consent. Commentators have noted how many of
Alphabet’s projects that might seem very separate from Google’s
core business of Search, serve an important role in increasing
advertising or data-collection opportunities. For example, Google
Glass, an augmented reality headset released in 2013, does not
immediately seem linked to the business of a search engine.
However, Google was awarded a number of advertising-related
patents that could be used with Google Glass. One of these
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patents, Pay-Per-Gaze, uses eye tracking to allow ‘advertisers [to]
be charged a fee based on whether a person looks directly at an ad
in the real world, and the fee can change based on how long they
interact with the ad’ (Miller and Bilton, 2013). The patent also
covers the measurement of pupil dilation so that ‘the inferred
emotional state information can be provided to an advertiser
(perhaps for a premium fee) so that the advertiser can gauge the
success of their advertising campaign’ (from the patent ‘Gaze
Tracking System’ (Neven, 2011) quoted in Truong, 2013). These
kinds of advances add an economic perspective with which to re-
evaluate Google’s mission statement: ‘to organize the world’s
information and make it universally accessible and useful’
(Google, ‘About us’).13 Producing a patented system that
monitors and records a person’s gaze and pupil dilation is a
way of making existing information ‘useful’ and provides a
physiological metric with which to measure relevance. If Google
Glass records that a person did not look at an advertisement for
long or was not excited by it, they can change or replace that
advertisement for something that sustains their gaze, widens their
pupils and quickens their pulse. Other such examples can be seen
in patents relating to other Alphabet ventures (the Other Bets
highlighted in the introduction) such as Nest and Google Home.
These patents range from ‘Advertising Based on Environmental
Conditions’ (Heath, 2012) (coordinating a range of different
sensors in the home and from mobile devices), to ‘Coupling an
Electronic Skin Tattoo to a Mobile Communication Device’
(Alberth, 2013) (which consists of a microphone permanently
embedded in a user’s throat). Such developments allow Google to
capture increasing amounts of data on and ofﬂine in order to
increase the opportunities to commercialise existing behaviour.
The strategy of AdWords marks a departure from traditional
advertising in a number of ways. As Levy argues, the AdWords
policy
‘reﬂected the different philosophy Google brought to
advertising in general. Google ads were answers. They were
solutions. ‘Ideally we wanted people to have a 50 to 100
percent click rate,’ says [Tim] Armstrong [Vice President of
Ad Sales at Google].’ (2011, p 112)
Aiming for a click rate above 50% means that Google hoped for
users to click on the sponsored advertisement link more often
than the top algorithmically produced organic result. In doing so,
Google wanted users to place their faith in the advertised links as
representing more useful or relevant answers than the search
results. The way in which the advertising is so embedded in the
function of Google’s search engine complicates an existing
notion, borrowed from older media forms such as television or
newspapers, that advertising revenue ﬁnancially supports a
medium but fundamentally stays separate to the content of that
medium. This then raises the question, is AdWords really a form
of advertising at all? To further interrogate this question we now
turn to Raymond Williams’ critical history of advertising
‘Advertising: The Magic System’ (1980).
AdWords in the context of ‘The Magic System’. Williams’ essay
provides a history of advertising as a speciﬁcally contextual
activity. To stress the historicity of advertising, Williams begins
by dismissing a dominant conception that the history of adver-
tising can be traced back to documents such as a ‘three thousand
year old papyrus from Thebes, offering a reward for a runaway
slave’ or he adds, tongue-in-cheek, ‘some pleasant recollections
from the Stone Age’ (1980, p 170). Instead, advertising ‘was
developed to sell goods, in a particular kind of economy’ (1980,
p 183) and following its history from the seventeenth century
onwards one can trace how it intersects with the changing nature
of capitalism. Advertising is an institutional method for
controlling ﬂows of capital and information; establishing the
demands of individuals in order to stabilise an otherwise
unpredictable free market; and, beginning in the late nineteenth
century, as a way of supporting mass consumption in highly
industrialised societies. Advertising, according to Williams, is not
as old as human culture, rather, it is functionally tied to the
different stages of capitalism. The Italian Neo-Marxists intro-
duced above argue that capitalism has recently undergone a
change of state from Fordism to Post-Fordism. Williams’ history
of advertising, although ﬁrst published in 1980, was written in
1961 and thus ends before the explosion of information tech-
nologies, globalising tendencies, and restructuring of traditional
modes of labour that Post-Fordism describes. Extending
Williams’ history to cover our current moment helps to con-
textualise Google’s model of advertising historically, as well as
the way in which it reﬂects and co-creates our contemporary
form of capitalism.
One of the key narratives of advertising, for Williams, is the
expansion of its scope, as its function grew to cover an increasing
number of commodities and services. As newspapers grew at the
end of the seventeenth century so did the number of advertise-
ments, but only for a speciﬁc sort of luxury items or medical
quackery: ‘[o]rdinary household goods were rarely advertised;
people knew where to get these’ (1980, p 172). Modern persuasive
advertising, which seeks to establish and perpetuate particular
cultural ideals, did not gain dominance until the interwar years of
the twentieth-century when it blended with wartime
propaganda–posters such as ‘Daddy, what did you do in the
Great War?’ (1980, p 180)–became inﬂuenced by advances in
modern Psychology, and rode the rising tide of mass media to
produce a network of cultural norms that could be bought into
through bourgeois products and services. As Williams describes:
‘in the 1850s advertising was mainly of a classiﬁed kind, in
speciﬁed parts of the publication. It was still widely felt, in
many kinds of trade, that (as a local newspaper summarised
the argument in 1859) ‘it is not respectable. Advertising is
resorted to for the purposes of introducing inferior articles
into the market.” (1980, p 173)
It is only in the twentieth-century that advertising became the
‘ofﬁcial art of modern capitalist society’ (1980, p 184), by which
Williams means two things. Firstly, it is the aesthetic that covers
the walls of our public places, the insides of newspapers, and
funds the employment of a whole creative class. Secondly, it is
also ‘art’ in the sense that it relates to advertising as a ‘magic
system’: a set of practices and cultural myths to perpetuate an
unfulﬁllable materialist desire that serves as an economic engine.
To Williams, advertising should be understood as a kind of
grammar for a speciﬁc historical moment. Given that Google’s
dominance in online advertising has led to its parent company,
Alphabet, to be valued as the second most valuable company on
the Fortune 500, with a market value $579,426 million (Fortune,
2017), what can Google’s mode of advertising tell us about the
grammar of contemporary capitalism online?
It is worth noting that the kinds of traditional mass-market
advertisements using slogans, celebrities and jingles that play to
our ‘basic personal relationships and anxieties’ (Williams, 1980, p
180) are still with us. Many kinds of advertisements that would
not be out of place in the context of twentieth-century
television or billboards can be found online, from the pre-roll
ads of YouTube to the banner ads underneath the masthead of
The New York Times (see Fig. 4). These advertisements that
borrow a familiar form have, however, been incorporated into a
different model of how media forms function online. This will be
outlined in the second half of this article, when our discussion
turns to Google’s AdSense programme. To understand new forms
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of advertising and their relation to contemporary online
capitalism in the light of Williams’ historical narrative, we must
pause a while longer on Google’s dominant form of advertising:
AdWords.
As outlined above, the way in which AdWords functions as a
‘global real-time and multilingual market’ (Kaplan, 2014, p 59)
mapping capital directly to speciﬁc words and phrases seems at
odds with the kinds of advertising that set to establish a
generalised demand in a mass market. The algorithmic rating and
auction system that selects a particular sponsored link mean that
AdWords provides the most relevant advertisement: a listing for
an existing demand, rather than a persuasion for something new
or different. Google’s algorithm, as with its organic results, aims
to weed out any misleading, irrelevant or ‘inferior articles’ (as
Williams’ 1859 newspaper puts it) and, as outlined above, only
charges companies for advertisements when, after Google has
selected them as the most relevant, they are actively chosen by
users. In addition, the standardised format in which sponsored
links are presented cuts out the art of advertising (see, again,
Fig. 1). With this outlook, AdWords barely seems like advertising
at all. However, these superﬁcial descriptions are not what deﬁnes
advertising; Google’s AdWords functions to structure and control
the ﬂow of information and capital in this speciﬁc moment of
contemporary capitalism. The grammar of digital capitalism is a
reﬂection of Google’s structuring of the web. Mass cultural appeal
gives way to the long tail of niche commerce; one-way channels of
communication and inﬂuence become algorithmic feedback loops
based around the harvesting of personal data; the growth of
immaterial labour expands the reiﬁcation of previously unmar-
ketable activates into proﬁtable goods and services. AdWords
functions as the intermediary form of communication between
companies, markets, and individuals that reﬂects the new
grammar of Post-Fordist digital commerce. Google’s monopoly
on the web is far from an extended caricature of the hegemony of
old-media moguls. Although Google dominates, the system is
decentred in a number of ways. The most signiﬁcant of which is
that tracing data patterns as a way of mapping ‘relevance’ draws
from the existing behaviours of individuals rather than following
any speciﬁc normative judgements established by Google. The
following section of this article introduces several challenges that
demonstrate that although Google dominates the online adver-
tising market, control of capital ﬂows is distributed throughout a
complex network of users.
AdWords and the general intellect. The context outlined above
demonstrates the ways in which Google draws information from
its users to put to economically instrumental ends. It is in this
perspective that Matteo Pasquinelli, in an essay speciﬁcally
focused on Google’s PageRank algorithm, describes, ‘Google [as]
a parasitic apparatus designed to capture the value produced by
the common intelligence’ (2009, p 155). Pasquinelli describes
Google as unproductive: seizing the surplus value of already
existing networks and establishing a hegemonic power structure
that prevents users from accessing the web without Google’s
inﬂuence. For Pasquinelli, the proﬁts Google makes are part of a
wider shift within existing economic and social arrangements,
which he describes as ‘cognitive capitalism’ situating his work
within a Post-Fordist framework. In doing so, Pasquinelli draws
on the work of Antonio Negri, in particular an essay co-authored
with Carlo Vercellone in 2007, in which they argue that rent
serves an important function for current modes of cognitive
capitalism, as well as Post-Fordism more widely. Pasquinelli
paraphrases their argument:
‘rent is the central mechanism of the passage from
industrial capitalism to cognitive capitalism. In classical
economic theory, rent is distinguished from proﬁt. Rent is
the parasitic income an owner can earn just by
possessing an asset and is traditionally associated
with land property. Proﬁt on the other hand, is meant
to be productive and is associated with the power of
capital to generate and extract a surplus.’ (Pasquinelli, 2009,
p 158)
Pasquinelli’s criticism is primarily focused on PageRank,
Google’s algorithm that ranks organic search results for each
query. For Pasquinelli, the information that PageRank uses is
latent in the network and Google’s algorithm is simply
organising it rather than creating or producing something
new. Google’s organic rankings are based on existing patterns of
hyperlinks on the web and uses these as an indication of
sentiment, much like an academic citation system does. So,
although a page with numerous hyperlinks pointing to it (or to
continue the citation metaphor, a widely-referenced article)
might not have been judged as good it is certainly relevant to a
particular group of people. Because the main metric of
AdWords, relevance, follows the PageRank model, Pasquinelli’s
argument can be applied to the AdWords mode of advertising.
Consequently, as Google’s methods of judging relevance are a
way of measuring existing behaviours, this information belongs
to all users, and as a result, Google is proﬁting unfairly; in Post-
Fordist terminology, Google is renting users their own
judgements. For example, searching for ‘Shakespeare’ returns
a number of high-quality results (see Fig. 3), high-quality in the
sense that the results are from reputable sources and pertain to
William Shakespeare (of course, judging the results as successful
relates to the subjective intentions of a user). However, this
hierarchy of quality has not been created by Google; the
PageRank algorithm simply reﬂects the already existing values
of web users that have linked to these sites. Pasquinelli’s
description of Google as global rentier is based on the
perspective that although we have Google to thank for
providing us access to these sites, the much more signiﬁcant
gratitude must go to the digital community of users for creating
this curated list through their collective actions online. There-
fore, that Google receives revenue for the usefulness of these
results is, from Pasquinelli’s perspective, wrong; as the
responsibility for the curation and hierarchy lies with the
community as a whole: journalists, bloggers, and any kind of
user that contributes online. These online participants are not
getting paid for their contributions. Instead, users are
reimbursed through free access to Google’s services, regardless
of their level of input. This further demonstrates a characteristic
of cognitive capitalism in a wider Post-Fordist context: when
users are online they are often unknowingly participating in
immaterial labour practices and are collectively remunerated
through access to a digital service.
Although Pasquinelli argues that ‘Google itself does not
produce any content’ (2009 p 157), rather it proﬁts from the
‘exploitation of a common cognitive space’ (2009, p 159), it is
important to temper this perspective. Search engine functionality
is inherently productive; foregrounding the attitudes of users,
through whatever means, is a necessary part of building a robust
infrastructure for the web. However, the inﬂuence that Google
has over the web means that although the web might be a
collectively produced space, we have essentially placed its
ownership in private hands. The terms of this debate are central
to an understanding of Google’s role online and while the
terminology borrowed from the history of Marxist critique can be
helpful, a critique of current technology must be wary of
anachronistic deployments that disﬁgure current forms of
capitalism into modes of pre-digital industrial capitalism.
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Fig. 3 Google results for 'Shakespeare' an example of high quality results. Screenshot taken by the author. This ﬁgure is licensed under a CC-BY Creative
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with permission
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To describe Google’s advertising with Post-Fordist terminology
we can say that AdWords is a way of functionalising the ‘general
intellect’. Here, Paolo Virno’s reading of this term and his way of
updating Marx’s original meaning is important:
‘Marx, without reserve, equated the general intellect (that is,
knowledge as principal productive force) with ﬁxed capital,
with the ‘objective scientiﬁc capacity’ inherent in the system
of machines. In this way he omitted the dimension,
absolutely preeminent today, in which the general intellect
presents itself as living labour […] In the Post-Fordist
environment, a decisive role is played by the inﬁnite variety
of concepts and logical schemes which cannot ever be set
within ﬁxed capital, being inseparable from the reiteration
of a plurality of living subjects. The general intellect
includes, thus, formal and informal knowledge, imagina-
tion, ethical propensities, mindsets, and ‘linguistic games’.
[…] The general intellect becomes an attribute of living
labour when the activity of the latter consists increasingly of
linguistic services.’ (2004, p 106)
An important feature of the general intellect, as described here,
is that it cannot be reduced to simply what a collective has
produced, but what it is capable of: the shared ‘faculty of thinking;
potential as such, not its countless particular realisations’ (2004, p
66). As contemporary capitalism continues its trend towards
Post-Fordist relations that are underpinned by cognitive or
immaterial labour, the general intellect can be functionalised like
never before. Google’s ﬁnancial proﬁts are far from the only
beneﬁts of the web, but allowing them to be consolidated reduces
the collective control of the general intellect, the ‘formal and
informal knowledge, imagination, ethical propensities, mindsets,
and ‘linguistic games”, that establish and sustain community.
This situation of privately regulated hyperconnection results in
what Virno calls ‘a publicness without a public sphere’ (2004, p
36). The web has actualised the previously theoretical connected-
ness of the multitude, however, the web has not become a
democratically shared space, instead it is owned and structured
around results that bring economic value and valorise non-
economic ideas. Rather than generalising about the web as one
enormous public sphere, it is more accurate to describe the web as
a congregation of various multitudes. Each of these publics have
different levels of visibility and inﬂuence. Importantly, Google
AdWords has an uneven coverage of these different multitudes
and this has a signiﬁcant impact on the shape and scope of the
web.
Google subdivides users and delivers different results based on
a large number of criteria (over 200), such as language,
geographical location, and previous search history. The weighting
of each criterion changes and is re-established every time a query
is searched; it is impossible for users to know which metrics and
characteristics inﬂuenced their results. Each search causes users to
be drawn into a particular multitude, each with its own general
intellect and each with its own corresponding sets of search
results. The logic of advertising then forces particular criteria to
have a disproportionate inﬂuence. Jeff Huber, Head of Ad
Engineering at Google, when interviewed by Levy underlined the
importance of national space in advertising. Quoted in In the
Plex, Huber says:
‘[y]es, search is a huge system, but it’s stateless—you can
easily serve it from ten different places in the world, and if
this version is slightly different than that version, the user
won’t know, nobody will notice. But with advertising, the
state is important, because advertisers are always updating
their campaigns, and micro transactions are happening at
ferocious rates per second, and all that has to be
synchronised.’ (in Levy, 2011, 116)
Therefore, because of the advertising incentives, a particular
metric such as location gains a more signiﬁcant inﬂuence in the
kinds of results provided. In addition, the time and effort spent
on engineering results follows from economic motivations,
prioritising criteria that corresponds to speciﬁc users. This leads
to a situation in which some languages become more valuable to
Google than others. In turn, because some languages have less
economic value on the web, the multitudes associated with those
languages are accommodated for far less.
There is a lot at stake in debates concerning the ownership of
information and good Internet citizenship requires that we stay
attentive to Google’s role; however, the general intellect, as the
current potential for thought, is far more than a collection of
speciﬁc documents that may or may not be used to extract
surplus value. Describing Google as merely parasitic ignores the
productive capacities that Google enables by making the web
usable. The accessibility of the web that Google’s search engine
has enabled has allowed for emergent activities and communities
that might not exist otherwise. In addition, Google does enable
ﬁnancial remuneration to many online content creators through
its second advertising programme, AdSense, the beneﬁts and
drawbacks of which are outlined in the second half of this article.
Although it is important to observe that these are two separate
systems and the beneﬁciaries of AdSense are by no means the
people who contributed to the structure of the web that AdWords
proﬁts from. An understanding of AdSense, provided in the latter
part of this article, in many ways problematises Pasquinelli’s
distinction of Google as the global rentier. However, even though
AdSense functions very differently than AdWords, an analysis of
the two systems provides further evidence as to why Post-Fordist
relations are a key lens for understanding Google search and
Google as a company.
The future of languages in an incentivised online environment.
Before moving on to a discussion of AdSense, which can be
described as a way individuals are compensated, or in less gen-
erous terms, how particular proﬁtable behaviours are encouraged
while others are deincentivised, we must outline a speciﬁc con-
sequence of AdWords: its effect on languages. The latent
knowledge contained within a language is a key part of the
general intellect and a central theme in Post-Fordist descriptions
of contemporary capitalism. Virno uses Gilbert Simondon’s
concept of individuation to describe how a language structures a
multitude:
‘[l]anguage is pre-individual; it is the historical-natural
language shared by all speakers of a certain community.
Language belongs to everybody and nobody […] the use of
the spoken word is, at ﬁrst, something inner-psychic, social,
public. A ‘private language’ does not exist.’ (Virno, 2004, p 77)
Each query entered into a search engine is part of this
individuating process: an interaction with a wider multitude that
through language constructs an individual as a subject. Subjects
cannot stand apart from their shared language, as Virno
paraphrases Simondon to argue that: ‘individuation is never
concluded […] the subject consists of the permanent interweav-
ing of pre-individual elements and individuated characteristics;
moreover, the subject is this interweaving’ (Virno, 2004, p 78). It
is, therefore, important for the very subjects that are continually
emerging that language does not become wholly co-opted by one
single economic description. In particular, the reiﬁcation of
AdWords means that the future of a number of languages is at
stake, alongside the multitudes that speak with them.
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The lack of diversity of language online is profound. Daniel
Prado outlines that: ‘[b]arely 5% of the world’s languages have a
presence in cyberspace’ (Prado, 2012, p 34). The decline in
language diversity is a general global trend off- and online and
Google’s impact on the web has followed, if not exacerbated, these
general trends. ‘The Globalization Group (2010) suggests that
90% of total international GDP is produced by the speakers of
only 14 languages’ (2012, p 38). Google has no incentive to
provide its services to language groups that do not represent a
proﬁtable market. In addition, the populations that are under-
represented on the web often correspond to less economically
developed areas, due to the infrastructure and costs required to
gain an online presence. Many of these individuals already have a
choice between more than one language, as Viola Krebs and
Vincent Climent-Ferrando attest in ‘Languages, Cyberspace,
Migrations’: ‘[i]t is estimated that close to one half of the world’s
population is bilingual’ (2012, p 232). However, the usefulness of
a second language online may contribute to a deterioration of a
more localised primary language, and the culture that it is tied to.
As Prado notes, when communities from less developed countries
come online, they choose not to use their native language: ‘[a]
2003 study by Marcel Diki-Kidiri showed that in a sample of 1374
African sites, only 3.22% used an African language as the
language of communication’ (2012, p 39–40). This creates a
feedback loop in which, the more that new users ﬁnd their own
language underrepresented, the less likely they are to use it.
Therefore, the notion that new web users ever have a choice to
start with is radically limited. The web has facilitated the growth
of economically useful languages but has prevented a number of
languages from ascending to the web. In his 2013 article, Andras
Kornai argues that this trend has developed signiﬁcantly enough
to be considered irreparable: the ﬁndings of Kornai’s team was
that ‘the vast majority (over 95%) of languages have already lost
the capacity to ascend digitally’ (2013, p 2). Languages can
disappear online if there is simply one usable alternative. This
feedback loop, that limits linguistic diversity, is perpetuated by
Google’s ﬁnancial model. The online success of some languages
and the failure of others is, in a sense, payment from Google to
particular linguistic communities. If users create content in a
speciﬁc language, Google can harvest its data and enable
advertising in that language, which makes searching in that
language proﬁtable for Google. If no one is using a language there
is no incentive for advertisers to pay Google for speciﬁc words
and phrases, thus Google accelerates the process of online
language death. Therefore, the control over which languages
survive is only partially the responsibility of content creators and
users; the power is predominately given over to Google.
This process, in which social responsibility is given over to a
private company, such as Google, is what Vaidhyanathan
describes as ‘public failure’ (2012, p 6). Google has succeeded
in dominating many aspects of people’s digital and embodied
lives worldwide; many of Alphabets’ enterprises make signiﬁcant
losses and are backed up by Google’s large advertising revenue;
competitors without such a large revenue stream have thus been
overtaken or been bought up by Google. Therefore, a discussion
regarding Google’s ﬁnancial success is also a discussion of a deal
that the global public have made with one company. As Siva
Vaidhyanathan puts it:
‘[b]ecause of its ease and power, because it does things so
cheaply and conveniently, it may cause us to miss
opportunities to do things better. Google’s presence in
certain markets, such as advertising or book search, retards
innovation and investment by potential competitors
because no one can realistically wrest attention or
investment from Google. And when Google does something
adequately and relatedly cheaply in the service of the public,
public institutions are relieved of the pressure to perform
their tasks well. This is an important and troubling
phenomenon I call public failure.’ (2012, p 6)
In the above quotation, Vaidhyanathan is focused primarily on
Google’s book scanning project and way in which governments
and universities have allowed Google overwhelming control over
the future of digital textual content–digitised analog content, as
well as born-digital text–because Google covers the costs of
investment. Vaidhyanathan’s term, ‘public failure’, is equally
applicable in the context of Google’s advertising empire. Google
is shaping the world we live in by dominating markets through
advertising revenue which, in turn, creates more advertising
opportunities. Free services, like Google Search, are the payments
back to speciﬁc multitudes in exchange for using their general
intellect for proﬁt. Considering the proﬁts involved, we could
argue that the public should be considered as employees of a
newly Post-Fordist workforce, creating ﬁnancially proﬁtable
data-sets in their ‘spare time’, similar to the way that Uber
drivers make additional revenue in their ‘spare time’.14 Also,
considering the job losses occurring worldwide (due, in part, to
the changing nature of work) this wealth needs to be better
shared. However, these arguments have revolved primarily
around the taxes that Google, and many other multinational
companies, avoid paying.15 However, to see Google’s proﬁts
within a Post-Fordist context, and to describe its users as quasi-
employees producing a linguistic landscape for Google to proﬁt
from, the payments back to the multitudes should be on a
different scale from the current tax systems. Google is not simply
making money from the creativity of individuals, but rather
shaping all cultural experience on the web into a system that can
be easily reiﬁed and commodiﬁed.
Google’s international expansion. A signiﬁcant part of Alphabet’s
agenda as a company is to extend their reach and open up the
number of contexts in which they can transform into proﬁtable
ventures. An example of this is their drive to make as much of
ofﬂine life machine readable, as mentioned earlier in reference to
Google Glass and its related patents. Another kind of expansion
that Alphabet has invested in is their drive to provide Internet
access across the globe. Google’s Project Loon, one of the
Alphabet subsidiaries developed using Google’s advertising
proﬁts, is a ‘network of balloons travelling on the edge of space,
designed to extend Internet connectivity to people in rural and
remote areas worldwide’ (‘Google: Project Loon’). The project has
been described by the company as a kind of social mission,
extending the Internet to 4.3 billion people, but in the MIT
Technology Review Tom Simonite writes:
‘[i]t is odd for a large public company to build out
infrastructure aimed at helping the world’s poorest people.
But in addition to Google’s professed desires to help the
world, the economics of ad-supported Web businesses give
the company other reasons to think big. It’s hard to ﬁnd
new customers in Internet markets such as the United
States. Getting billions more people online would provide a
valuable new supply of eyeballs and personal data for ad
targeting. That’s one reason Project Loon will have
competition: in 2014 Facebook bought a company that
makes solar-powered drones so it can start its own airborne
Internet project.’ (2015)
In this way, it describes another ‘public failure’ in which a
‘blessing’ becomes a ‘necessary–seemingly natural–part of our
daily lives’ (Vaidhyanathan, 2012, p 6–7). This provides
opportunities for the greater logic of Post-Fordism to enter into
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new rural contexts such as ‘isolated parts of Brazil, Australia, and
New Zealand’ (Simonite, 2015). Simonite cites Sunil Abraham,
executive director of the Centre for Internet and Society, a think
tank in Bangalore, writing that, Abraham
‘is also wary of Project Loon because of the way Google and
other Western Internet companies have operated in
developing countries in recent years. They have cut deals
with telecoms in India and other countries to make it free
to access their websites, disadvantaging local competitors.
‘Anyone coming with deep pockets and new technology I
would welcome,’ he says, but he adds that governments
should ﬁx up their patchy regulatory regimes ﬁrst to ensure
that everyone—not just Google and its partners—really
does beneﬁt.’ (quoted in Simonite, 2015).
In the way, not only do the proﬁts of advertising come to
underlie the epistemological landscape of the web, but also the
infrastructure required for Internet access, offered for free to
individuals in developing countries. The potential beneﬁts of
opening the Internet up to a wider range of individuals, from
different cultures, speaking different languages are multifarious;
however, these beneﬁts are not inevitable. If we allow Google, or
any other single company, to dictate the physical and digital
infrastructure of the web, those multifarious beneﬁts, in order to
gain traction, will have to conform to the particular dominant
economic affordances of the web. Given the impact of AdWords’
reiﬁcation of language upon linguistic diversity, outlined above,
such international expansion may only solidify the current
boundaries and limitations of the web. This is not to say that
Google’s actions are implemented in bad faith, only that the
hegemonic situation means that any diversity that is not
proﬁtable will struggle and the beneﬁts of widening our online
community may well be drastically limited as a consequence. It is
in this context, of economic affordances dictating the landscape of
the web, that we turn to AdSense, the other side of Google’s
advertising coin.
AdSense and Post-Fordism. AdSense is the second, smaller,
advertising programme that Google operates. AdSense is Google’s
brokerage programme that enables online content creators to
monetise their content by placing third-party adverts on their
websites, blogs, or YouTube videos. Sullivan uses the analogy that
AdSense ‘basically turned the Web into a giant Google billboard.
It effectively meant that Google could turn everyone’s content
into a place for Google ads’ (quoted in Auletta, 2011, p 91).
AdSense allows users to monetise their online content by setting
aside spaces (see Fig. 4 for an example) that Google can ﬁll with
adverts that are relevant to the content of the site and/or the user
visiting the site. This is accomplished in the following way:
‘Google’s software crawls the site, performs semantic
analysis on the text on each page, and then automatically
selects ads that are displayed […] matched to the meaning
of the text. It calls this ‘contextual advertising.’ Site owners
and Google split the proceeds when visitors click on the
ads.’ (Stross, 2009, p 159)
This process of matching advertisements to content and users
has had a large impact on the landscape of the web today,
reinforcing associations and shaping what kinds of activities can
become proﬁtable. In addition, AdSense as the most dominant
online advertising provider has shaped the ﬂows of information
and capital in a way that promotes Post-Fordist labour relations
between Internet users. There are many beneﬁts to the AdSense
model and without it the web would be unrecognisable. However,
there are serious negative consequences to a system that values
page views, engagements, and shares above all else. This section
will cover the impact of AdSense on online discourse and, in
particular, analyse the proﬁtability of fake news in the 2016 US
presidential election.
AdSense and fake news. It is important to have a clear deﬁnition
of fake news because it refers to a speciﬁc phenomenon that grew
in inﬂuence during the 2016 US presidential election. Since
entering ofﬁce, President Trump has adopted the phrase, using it
against legitimate media organisations, such as CNN, in a way
that has muddied the term. Here, the term fake news is used in
line with Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow’s deﬁnition as
‘news articles that are intentionally and veriﬁably false, and could
mislead readers’ (2017, p 213). In this way, fake news refers to a
speciﬁc discourse that proliferated around the presidential elec-
tion and documented through investigations by BuzzFeed News,
The Guardian, and in Allcott and Gentzkow’s article ‘Social
Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election’. Of particular
importance is that although the most prominent topic of fake
news was–and still is–politics, analysis suggests that these fabri-
cated news stories were written purposely for viral impact and
often created purely for proﬁt. Their success can be used to
outline some media-speciﬁc characteristics of the web and the
consequences of structuring the online news environment around
advertising revenue. Fake news is not new, nor is it without
precedent; Allcott and Gentzkow’s article, currently the only
academic paper that speciﬁcally addresses fake news, provides a
multi-disciplinary literature review concerning related phenom-
ena, such as conspiracy theories, as well as a survey of journalistic
reports that give examples of individuals who have produced fake
news for a number of years. However, the increased proliferation
and potential impact of fake news in the 2016 presidential elec-
tion represents a sea-change, one in which Google’s AdSense
programme and Google’s relationship to the second biggest
online advertiser, Facebook, looms large.
Although it is not unusual for the US presidential elections to
become an axis around which false claims circulate, the 2016
election saw a different level of misinformation. Articles with
inﬂammatory titles, and which could easily be debunked, such as:
‘Pope Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for
President, Releases Statement’, ‘Trump Offering Free One-Way
Tickets to Africa & Mexico for Those Who Wanna Leave
America’, and ‘Van Full Of Illegals Shows Up To Vote Clinton At
SIX Polling Places, Still Think Voter Fraud Is A Myth?’ circulated
on social media, in particular on Facebook, at an unprecedented
scale. In fact, analysis by BuzzFeed News showed that in ‘the ﬁnal
3 months of the US presidential campaign, the top-performing
fake election news stories on Facebook generated more engage-
ment than the top stories from major news outlets such as
New York Times, Washington Post, Hufﬁngton Post, NBC News,
and others’ (Silverman, 2016). Although some of the sources that
created and disseminated these stories did so for politically
motivated reasons, a number of investigations uncovered that the
majority of fake news stories were engineered purely to make
money from online advertising networks, particularly Google’s,
and designed without any political motive. It was reported by
BuzzFeed and The Guardian that:
‘[o]ver the past year, the Macedonian town of Veles
(population 45,000) has experienced a digital gold rush as
locals launched at least 140 US politics websites. These sites
have American-sounding domain names such as World-
Politicus.com, TrumpVision365.com, USConservativeTo-
day.com, DonaldTrumpNews.co, and USADailyPolitics.
com. They almost all publish aggressively pro-Trump
content aimed at conservatives and Trump supporters in
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the US. […] The young Macedonians who run these sites
say they don’t care about Donald Trump […] These sites
open a window into the economic incentives behind
producing misinformation speciﬁcally for the wealthiest
advertising markets and speciﬁcally for Facebook, the
world’s largest social network, as well as within online
advertising networks such as Google AdSense.’ (Silverman
and Alexander, 2016)
Although not all the hyperpartisan, clickbait, and hoax news
came from Veles, many news reports also conﬁrmed sources in
the US, the geographical and political detachment of those
working from Macedonia exempliﬁed the culture of making
money through advertising revenue regardless of the content or
consequences. Hannah Parkinson’s report in the The Guardian
described the Veles fake news writers as young people who were
simply ‘non-partisan kids looking for cash just catering to
demand’ (2016). Many of the individuals producing fake news
about the election had already been earning a good living from
advertising revenue of websites aimed at an American audience.
Many of the Macedonian creators agreed to be interviewed and it
becomes clear that, although a small minority favoured Trump,
the subject matter chosen was interchangeable and based around
proﬁtable topics. Many of the writers had been creating viral
content for years, for example:
‘[i]n Veles, Aleksandar and Borce Velkovski are so
renowned for the health food website they started that
they’re known as the Healthy Brothers HealthyFoodHouse.
com is a jumble of diet and beauty advice, natural remedies,
and other nostrums. It gorges on advertising as it counsels
readers to put a bar of soap under their bedsheets to relieve
nightly leg cramps or to improve their red-blood-cell count
Fig. 4 Examples of AdSense banners on the front page of The New York Times website. Screenshot taken by the author. This ﬁgure is licensed under a
CC-BY Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
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with homemade beet syrup. Somehow the website’s Face-
book page has drawn 2 million followers; more than 10
million unique visitors come to HealthyFoodHouse.com
every month.’ (Subramanian, 2017)
The creators reinvest part of their earnings to buy fake
Facebook proﬁles and by paying Facebook directly to promote
their pages. The analytic feedback tools provided by Facebook
and Google allow the creators to develop a good understanding of
the criteria that drive content to become viral. Although
politically focused content is a recent adaptation, the culture of
seeing this kind of activity as a sustainable job had been
established for years in Veles. Another creator from Veles, Mirko
Ceselkoski, explained in an interview with Samanth Subramanian
that he began
‘in the early 2000s. He built seven or eight websites—about
muscle cars or celebrities or superyachts, all oriented
toward the American reader, because an American reader is
roughly three times more valuable than a non-American
one. For ﬁve or six hours of daily toil, Ceselkoski says, you
can earn approximately $1000 a month. Many Macedo-
nians can spare the time; the unemployment rate is around
24 percent.’ (2017)
In 2011 Ceselkoski began teaching courses in creating viral
media and coaching other individuals, for signiﬁcant tuition fees,
in viral content creation and ways of driving Facebook
engagements. Those who took classes from Ceselkoski included
the Healthy Brothers as well as individuals responsible for pro-
Trump fake news sites. The previous proﬁts pale in comparison
to the success of election fake news ‘[b]etween August and
November, Boris [18-year-old from Veles, real name redacted]
earned nearly $16,000 off his two pro-Trump websites. The
average monthly salary in Macedonia is $371’ (Subramanian,
2017). The nature of this Macedonian cottage industry bears
some similarity to various international cyber-crimes, such as the
419 advanced fee scams including the infamous Nigerian prince
scam. The fake news writers might not be directly taking money
from individuals but they are making money from misleading
those in more economically afﬂuent countries. Fake news is not
considered criminal in the way that 419 scams are; however, both
activities articulate similar characteristics of a globalised online
space.
This kind of relationship between individuals and institutions
operationalised through international ﬂows of information,
labour, and capital exempliﬁes a Post-Fordist logic outlined at
the start of this article. Fabricated stories or not, all creation of
online content, whether news or opinion, is a form of precarious
employment that foregrounds various aspects of Post-Fordism,
many of which lie outside the scope of this article. If this article
were to focus directly on the kind of employment of those writing
fake news stories, a Post-Fordist lens would highlight the
immaterial, ﬂexible, individualised nature of that work. However,
it should be clear that the proliferation of fake news impacted and
incorporated a much larger group of individuals than simply
those writing the stories. By focusing on the wider effects, rather
than speciﬁcally the niche group of writers, the consequences of
online advertising supported content demonstrates a proliferation
of Post-Fordist logic, even in the lives of those whose employment
is ﬁrmly material, industrial, or Fordist.
In particular, the writing, reading and sharing of fake news
articles can be seen as components of an immaterial labour
arrangement. Immaterial labour is described by Maurizio
Lazzarato as:
‘the activity that produces the ‘cultural content’ of the
commodity, immaterial labour involves a series of activities
that are not normally recognised as ‘work’—in other words,
the kinds of activities involved in deﬁning and ﬁxing cultural
and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and,
more strategically, public opinion.’ (2014, p 133)
Immaterial labour is not unique to Post-Fordism, it has served
a role stabilising previous economic arrangements, for example,
the marketing of cultural values in the twentieth-century that
Adorno and Horkheimer refer to as the culture industry.
However, the immaterial labour of producing fake news does
not shape the values of consumers in order to sell them
commodities. Instead, fake news functions by both ﬁxing certain
norms and acting as the commodity that matches such a demand;
however, such a demand is exacerbated, rather than fulﬁlled.
These norms and values are part of another element of Post-
Fordist labour: affective capitalism. Such a framework highlights
the affective qualities of fake news: the reactions it creates as well
as the social atmosphere it builds upon. Kylie Jarrett, following
the work of Brian Massumi (2002), describes affect as
‘those sensory experiences of movement and feeling that are
part of the social, cultural and psychological experience of
individuals, but which lie beyond the directly signifying
properties of discourse. It is differentiated from emotion for
it is as an embodied intensity that is outside conscious
articulation.’ (Jarrett, 2015, p 121)
Here, the similarity to the notion of the ‘general intellect’ should
be noted. Jarrett uses such a perspective within a feminist critique
of digital labour in order to argue that it is a mistake to describe
individuals online only in terms of rational action. Isto Huvila
continues such a call in the context of search engines. Huvila
argues that rather than seeing individuals as rational information
seekers, what ‘counts in the contemporary affective economy of
knowing, is the affective attachment to a sensation of being able to
know’ (Huvila, 2016, p 577). However, although affect must have a
signiﬁcant bearing on the spread of fake news, it is difﬁcult to
establish a clear understanding of how and why fake news gained
traction, with readers, in the way that it did. Were individuals
convinced of the accuracy of the stories or were they shared for
other reasons? In taking a large-scale economic focus, this article
outlines the economic and advertising-dependent incentives
behind the creation and proliferation of fake news, but does not
address the smaller-scale actions of individuals, rational or
otherwise, on which such a proliferation depends. However, even
if nothing is known about their reception, it is the economic
structure that provided the informational affordances required for
fake news to ﬂourish. It is this economic structure that was jointly
reinforced by the way in which Google and Facebook prioritise
online content.
The reciprocal relationship between AdSense and Facebook.
Although this international aspect of fake news is important,
many of the most successful fake news creators reside in the US,
for example, Liberty Writers News who were the focus of an
interview by The Guardian:
‘Liberty Writers News, a two-person site operating out of a
house in the San Francisco Bay Area, generates income of
between $10,000 and $40,000 a month from banks of ads
that run along the side and bottom of every story. Paris
Wade and his partner Ben Goldman have mastered the art
of getting trafﬁc. The ability to write a clickbaity headline,
toss in some user-generated video found on YouTube, and
dash off a 400-word post in 15 to 30 min is a skill they don’t
teach in journalism school, says Wade, who graduated from
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the University of Tennessee with a degree in advertising.’
(Tynan, 2016)
The banks of advertising described were indicated as those
provided by AdSense (see SadBotTrue), although interviewees
described using multiple platforms. The pair disclose that they
‘spend around $3000 a month paying Facebook to promote the
page’ and that ‘95% of our [Liberty Writers News] trafﬁc is
coming from Facebook’. Here, Facebook beneﬁts in two ways.
First, Liberty Writers News pay Facebook directly to promote
their site and second, Liberty Writers News urge their readers to
‘Share this right now! Let’s beat the liberal media to it. Share,
share, share it all over Facebook’ (Tynan, 2016), which in turn
increases the time users spend on Facebook and provides further
advertising opportunities. Facebook and Google have little
incentive to stop a spread of misinformation as it represents
some of the most proﬁtable content on which they host
advertisements. In an interview with Bangor Daily News, one
US-based fake news creator, Paul Horner, explained his
involvement:
‘[m]y sites were picked up by Trump supporters all the
time. I think Trump is in the White House because of me.
His followers don’t fact-check anything – they’ll post
everything, believe anything. His campaign manager posted
my story about a protester getting paid $3500 as fact. Like, I
made that up. I posted a fake ad on Craigslist.’ (Quoted in
Dewey, 2016)
In addition to Trump’s campaign manager, Corey Lewan-
dowski, circulating and promoting Horner’s fake news, Caitlin
Dewey reports that Eric Trump and Kellyanne Conway also
tweeted fake news stories from Horner’s site. The original version
of the Breitbart article ‘Palin on Paid Anti-Trump Protesters:
“Not Even President Yet and Our Guy’s Already Creating Jobs”
(Moons, 2016) cited Horner’s fake news story as a source.
Horner’s fake news site, abcnews.com.co, still hosts the original
article ‘Donald Trump Protester Speaks Out: “I Was Paid $3500
To Protest Trump’s Rally”’ but now starts with an added message
that ‘this story is not real […] This story is mocking all of you
sheep who think protesters are getting paid’ (Horner, 2016) (see
Fig. 5). Searching using the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine
we can see that this message was not part of the original story (see
Fig. 6). Since the results of the election Horner has taken part in
numbers of interviews with established news organisations,
Channel 4 for example, in which he has promoted himself as
someone trying to make the public better informed. In the
context of digital capitalism, whether his articles were meant to
fuel or satirise Trump supporters is unimportant. Horner, along
with many others, has ﬁnancially beneﬁted from ﬂows of
information that are promoted and incentivised by Google
AdSense and social media sites such as Facebook.
As far as advertising revenue is concerned, Google has no
incentive to care whether these stories are being read as satire by
Democrats or sincerely by Republicans. Dewey’s article describes
how Horner has ‘made his living off viral news hoaxes for several
years’. In response to a question referring to the announcements
Fig. 5 Paul Horner’s ‘Donald Trump Protester Speaks Out: “I Was Paid $3,500 To Protest Trumps Rally”’ article, screenshot as of 8/6/17, including ‘This
story is not real’ paragraph. Screenshot taken by the author. Note: Horner’s website was designed to imitate that of the American Broadcasting Company
(ABC) News but is not associated with that organisation in any way. The domain abcnews.com.co was shut down as of 3/10/17. An archive of the site can
still be viewed using the Internet Archives’ waybackmachine. This ﬁgure is not covered by a CC- BY Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License. This ﬁgure is reproduced according to the terms of Fair Use
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from Facebook and Google that they would stop allowing fake
news sites to use their advertising services, Horner speaks directly
to Google’s ﬁnancial incentives to be complicit:
‘[r]ight now I make like $10,000 a month from AdSense. I
know ways of getting hooked up under different names and
sites. So probably if they cracked down, I would try
different things. I have at least 10 sites right now. If they
crack down on a couple, I’ll just use others. […] Plus,
Facebook and AdSense make a lot of money from
[advertising on fake news sites] for them to just get rid of
it. They’d lose a lot of money.’ (Dewey, 2016)
Google and Facebook both released statements in mid-
November 2016 that they would ﬁght against fake news (Love
and Cooke, 2016) by restricting their advertising, with Google
claiming the ban would come into effect ‘imminently’ (Wingﬁeld
et al., 2016). However, a number of different reports, including
The Wall Street Journal and Media Matters, detailed ‘advertise-
ments placed by Google on at least 24 websites that have a track
record for pushing fake news stories—stories with fabricated
information packaged to appear as a legitimate news story’ (Suen
et al., 2016). The Media Matters report was conducted on the
12th December, almost a full month after Google stated it would
ban fake news sites from their revenue stream on 14th November.
The most popular fake news during the 2016 election favoured
Trump over Hillary Clinton. Allcott and Gentzkow collected a
database of fake news stories from three major repositories and
found that their database contained ‘115 pro-Trump fake stories
that were shared on Facebook a total of 30 million times, and 41
pro-Clinton fake stories shared a total of 7.6 million times’ (2017,
p 212). However, this number does not necessarily mean that all
those who were sharing it were Trump supporters. Because so
many of the fake news creators aimed to create stories with the
largest potential to be widely shared, rather than politically
persuade, it may be the case that the most viral stories were those
that mobilised online users from across the political spectrum to
share the article through outrage, disbelief, agreement or any
other motivating factor. Using ‘previously reported statistics for
the ratio of page visits to shares of stories on social media’ Allcott
and Gentzkow calculate that the combined ‘38 million shares of
fake news in [their] database translates into 760 million instances
of a user clicking through and reading a fake news story, or about
three stories read per American adult’ (2017, p 212). In addition,
this ﬁgure does not even include users who partially read stories
or view headlines within Facebook, Twitter, or Google News
directly. These numbers indicate that fake news is not a small
issue or one that is easily dismissed. These ﬁgures also emphasise
the extensive reach that these fake news article had, the
accountability of which, also lies with Google and Facebook.
Not only did these two companies proﬁt from the surfeit of fake
news, but actively promoted it, whether algorithmically or
intentionally, through search engine results and social media
feeds.
The wider changes in the online access to journalism mean that
traditional media outlets now compete for revenue on the same
Fig. 6 Paul Horner’s ‘Donald Trump Protester Speaks Out: “I Was Paid $3500 To Protest Trumps Rally”’ article, as of 25/3/16 (via waybackmachine),
without the ‘This story is not real’ paragraph. Screenshot taken by the author. Note: Horner’s website was designed to imitate that of the American
Broadcasting Company (ABC) News but is not associated with that organisation in any way. The domain abcnews.com.co was shut down as of 3/10/17.
An archive of the site can still be viewed using the Internet Archives’ waybackmachine. This ﬁgure is not covered by a CC- BY Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License. This ﬁgure is reproduced according to the terms of Fair Use
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terms as fake news sites. Without the institutional stability of
print sales16 or other regular revenue support, traditional media
organisations are drawn into writing in ways that attract attention
and generate as many individual page views as possible, in order
to increase advertising revenue. Combined with the media-
speciﬁc characteristics of search engine results and social media
feeds that decontextualise individual articles and present a diverse
range of content, Google and Facebook encourage a logic that
incentives clickbait headlines. There is a clear difference between
misleading articles and fake news, however, in many ways fake
news is a gross exaggeration of current online news practices
rather than an activity that occupies a completely separate
domain. As long as proﬁts are tied directly to how much an article
is shared or viewed then very particular kinds of media content
will continue to be incentivised over others.
Fake news is just one example to consider when investigating
how Google creates avenues for proﬁt and how Google’s
economics co-depend on other online institutions, in particular,
Facebook. These mutual incentives promote particular kinds of
relationships between individual web users and online institutions
such as Facebook and Google in a way that promotes Post-Fordist
interactions. Immaterial labour is becoming a more expansive
domain. As Maurizio Lazzarato argues,
‘[i]f production today is directly the production of a social
relation, then the ‘raw material’ of immaterial labour is
subjectivity and the ‘ideological’ environment in which this
subjectivity lives and reproduces. The production of
subjectivity ceases to be only an instrument of social
control (for the reproduction of mercantile relationships)
and becomes directly productive, [immaterial workers]
satisfy a demand by the consumer and at the same time
establish that demand.’ (2014, p 143)
The interrelations of Google, Facebook, creators of fake news,
and users demonstrate how economic value is being created and
harvested from relationships that many online users would not
see as primarily economic. These examples also demonstrate how
the rise of immaterial labour by no means replaces traditional
material labour, but that increasingly the spare time of individuals
is spend working, in a Post-Fordist sense, to increase the proﬁts of
particular institutions and creators. Even if a user shares a piece
of fake news out of outrage, they have still acted within a system
that uses advertising revenue to ﬁnancially compensate its
creator, the social media network, and the company that
supported its advertising. It is important that web users
understand that the web is structured around ﬁnancial incentives
and that, collectively, the actions of following links and sharing
pages are intrinsically economic and carry signiﬁcant conse-
quences for the future of the global information ecology.
Conclusions
The implications of many of the issues outlined in this article are
signiﬁcant; many of the consequences may seem inescapable or at
least difﬁcult to inﬂuence. For example, the future of diminishing
language diversity appears inevitable, if current economic
incentives stay as they are. Nevertheless, this article highlights
that there are still potential routes for change. The preceding
argument has articulated why Post-Fordist theory provides a
useful context for understanding Google’s relationship to con-
temporary digital capitalism. Grounding an understanding of
terminology such as immaterial labour and the general intellect
can recontextualise current practices and clarify certain inter-
sections of information, capital, and individual agency. When
considered alongside Williams’ history of advertising, this
approach can help us better articulate the current state of
capitalism and the particular inﬂuence that Google possesses.
Describing Google as an advertising company, while appreciating
the historically situated nature of this form of advertising, rear-
ticulates the motives behind Alphabet’s other projects and
underlines how that company is shaping much more than search
engine results. Finally, the example of fake news and its expansion
during the 2016 US presidential election, although alarming,
should serve as an illustration of how online economic incentives
produce signiﬁcant effects that implicate all individuals on a
global scale. In summary, this article demonstrates that con-
temporary digital capitalism is not divorced from the non-digital
world, but rather, a signiﬁcant part of much larger shift within
twenty-ﬁrst century capitalism. Google’s inﬂuence on this shift is
considerable, and therefore, proper Internet citizenship requires
that we understand the sway that this particular company holds
over current and future digital practices. This understanding is
essential if we are to build and sustain a web that reﬂects the
diverse cultures of its global users, rather than the economic
incentives of a single company.
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Notes
1 Examples of such disciplinary approaches are as follows: for computer science, see
Langville and Meyer (2012); for law, see Vaidhyanathan (2012); for politics, see
Ippolita (2013) and Assange (2016); for information retrieval, see Lewandowski (ed.)
(2012); for new media studies, see Hillis et al. (2012) and König and Rasch (eds.)
(2014).
2 Alphabet has been listed as the world’s most valuable company on a number of
occasions; see Solomon, 2016a, b.
3 For clarity, this article relies on synecdoche by using ‘AdWords’ to refer to ‘Google
properties’ and using ‘AdSense’ to refer to ‘Google Network Members’ properties’.
There are other smaller properties detailed in Alphabet 2016 pages 23 and 24,
respectively. However, these smaller properties follow the systems developed by
AdWords and AdSense and so, in the main, can be ignored.
4 The collection Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics (ed. Virno and Hardt,
2006) goes some way to providing a comprehensive overview of the important Post-
Fordist theorists, although as is noted in its introduction three key members, Franco
Berardi, Sergio Bologna, and Giuseppe Cocco, were not included for various reasons.
5 Fordism emphasises standardisation, de-skilling of the workforce through assembly-
line manufacture, and the linking of wages to prices of products in order to ensure that
workers could function as consumers of their products. For a more detailed deﬁnition
and relationship to later forms of capitalism see Amin (1994).
6 See: Google ‘AdWords policies’
7 For example, it is illegal to advertise online gambling websites in the USA but legal in
the UK and Google follows these geographical distinctions online. See, Google
‘AdWord Policies Help: Gambling and Games’
8 For example, the 11 year legal battle between Google Books and The Authors Guild, in
which Google’s book scanning activities were ruled as legal under fair use, see Cohen,
2015.
9 As Anderson explains it, the ‘theory of the Long Tail is that our culture and economy
is increasingly shifting away from a focus on a relatively small number of ‘hits’
(mainstream products and markets) at the head of the demand curve and toward a
huge number of niches in the tail.’ (Anderson)
10 Google encourages this arrangement and details advice for working with a third
party, see ‘Google: Advertiser guide’
11 See, Racer Nation Information, 2016.
12 See, Google ‘Welcome to the 2017 Google Online Marketing Challenge’
13 Various technology commentators have also noted similar data-capture uses for
many of Google’s acquisitions. For example, Google acquired smart thermostat and
smoke detector company Nest in 2013 for $3.2 billion. John C. Havens’, 2014 article
‘The Connected Home May Become the Collected Home’ discusses how Google
might use these data for personalised advertising purposes.
14 Research has shown that, for most people working in ﬂexible labour roles, this work
is not their primary means of income. See, for example, Hall and Krueger, 2015 who
show that 51% of Uber drivers ‘drive for less than 15 hours a week, and […] 85
percent chose to drive less than 35 hours a week.’
15 Google avoids taxes in a number of different ways, including housing proﬁts in
Bermuda, to which Eric Schmidt commented ‘I am very proud of the structure that
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we set up. We did it based on the incentives that the governments offered us to
operate.’ See Kavoussi’s, 2012 article: ‘Google Chairman Eric Schmidt Defends Tax
Dodge: “It’s Called Capitalism”’
16 A Pew Research study found that between 2005 and 2015 US newspaper ‘weekday
circulation has fallen 17% and ad revenue more than 50%’ see Mitchell and Matsa,
2015.
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